Doka La ( A 269 square kilometer patch of Bhutan’s territory claimed by China ) is located over the Zom Cheri ridge in the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley where India( i.e at Sikkim), Bhutan and China Tri Junction meets. Doka La is the Indian name of the region which Bhutan recognise as Dokalam, while china claims it as part of its Donglang region.
Historical Background of the Dispute
Doklam Plateau remained as a contested territory between Bhutan & China for long time since 1984. Bhutan claim Doklam as its territory but China has long eyed this area. China has been keen to establish its physical presence in a region that it claims belong to China according to 1890 Anglo - Chinese Convention. Both Bhutan and China have long discussed the dispute, over 24 rounds of negotiations that began in 1984.
In the early 1990's Beijing have offered a "packaged deal" to Thimpu under which the Chinese agreed to renounce their claim over the 495 Sq km disputed land in the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys to the north, in exchange for 269 Sq km Doklam plateau. Bhutan government would relay to India as it had special relationship with India through Indo- Bhuttan Friendship Treaty which gives New Delhi great influence in managing Thimphu's foreign relations. India was able to convince Bhutan to defer any so called Package deal. Hence China committed through the bilateral agreements of 1988 & 1998 with Bhutan to respect the status quo and not to change the status quo unilaterally.
But things changed after India and Bhutan renegotiated their friendship treaty in 2007 which gave Thimphu more autonomy in their Foreign Policy. Post 2008, under Jigme Thinley ( Bhutan's 1st elected PM ) Bhutan moved closer to China. He even held a controversial meeting with then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio de Janerio in 2012, suggesting that Bhutan was thinking of establishing Consular relation with China. It was some time during this period, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is understood to have started to built the dirt track at Doklam and the Bhutanese army appears not to have objected to it then. In 2013, Indian government's decision to withdraw energy subsidies to Bhutan on the eve of its general election contributed to Jigme Thinley's defeat. When the new PM Tshering Tobgay's government came to power, Bhutan came on board with India. China seems to have realized it could no longer press for so called "packaged deal" with Bhutan.
What lead to the current conflict ?
June 2017 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers engaged in building road-works on the disputed Doklam plateau. China’s action of sending PLA construction teams with earth moving equipment to forcibly build a road upsets a carefully preserved peace and a direct violation of the 1988 and 1998 agreement between Bhutan and China. This is nothing but a yet another instance of Cartographic aggression by China.
How did India got entangled in this conflict ?
In June 2017 Indian troops intervened to block the path of Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers engaged in building road-works on the Doklam plateau. India's involvement is aimed to prevent China from changing the status quo by building a road on territory claimed by Bhutan.
The 220km Sikkim( India) -Tibet (China) section of the boundary was the only settled segment of the 3,488 km Sino-Indian border, It adheres to the Anglo - Chinese convention of 1890, signed between Britain and China. The exact location of the tri - junction is today in dispute. The Indian side puts it near Batang La, while China claims that it is located at Mt. Gipmochi further south. Bhutanese accept the fact that the tri - junction is at Batang La. It is India’s contention that an agreement was reached in 2012 that it would be finalized only after “consultations” with concerned countries. This led to stand - off between Indian army and PLA.
Beijing responded by closing access to Indian pilgrims seeking to proceed through the Nathu La pass on to Kailash-Mansarovar. In fact During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014 the stretch was opened as an alternative route to Kailash Mansarovar for Indian pilgrims as a confidence-building measure. The Lipulekh route involves a treacherous trek of about 200 km, while Nathu La route call for trekking for only 35 km.
Why did Indian get Involved in this Bilateral dispute ?
- The unique Geo- Strategic position of the Chumbi vally. China is eyeing an opportunity to establish a strong presence close to the Indian border. Any change in the status quo would bring China within striking distance of India's vulnerable and slender "Chicken Neck Siliguri Corridor",a dangerous choke point which is the life line to India's North East.
- India's Privileged relationship with Bhutan. Though the India - Bhutan friendship treat was revised in 2007 to give Thimphu more autonomy, still notes that the two countries "shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests" "neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of other". By upholding the rights of its ally, India intend to convey the importance New Delhi attaches to its special relationship with Thimphu, as well as to signal that it intends to preserve its traditional military advantage in the over all Sikkim sector.
However china does not recognise the India - Bhutan special relationship, Chinese believe that on their own they can make peace with Bhutan and it is India's Interference that is complicating the matter.
Has Bhutan became an "egg between two rocks" ? How long can Bhutan stay with India in this stand off ? are certain fundamental questions that one may rise. Any change in the satus quo will hurt Bhutan first as it will lose very strategic territory and it will lose access to India. So for Bhutan too there are vital strategic interests involved in any compromise. Given such situation we can presume that Thimphu will stick to its ground along with India as there is convergence of strategic interests.
What might have led to the stand-off?
- China's own global ambitions and its need to show its Asian neighbors its muscular might.
- May be an account of Xi Jinping showing strength ahead of a possibly difficult Chinese Communist Party National Congress this October - November
- The stand - off comes in a period when the wheels are coming off the India - China wagon.
New Delhi has expressed disappointment over China’s rejection of its concerns on sovereignty issues involving CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor), China's refusal to corner Pakistan on cross-border terrorism and China using technical hold in naming Masood Azhar (JeM head) as International terrorist in UNSC, China blocking India’s bid for NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) membership.
On the other hand, Beijing is aggrieved by the Dalai Lama's visit to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in April 2017, India's aggressive repudiation of the Belt and Road Initiative (To recall, Bhutan was the only South Asian state that did not participate in the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, along with India), India's forward leaning posture in South China Sea, India's cooperation with the U.S. and Japan on maritime issues like Malabar Exercise in the India ocean, The uptick in rhetoric, including statements from the Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister questioning India’s “One China Policy” on Tibet, and from Army chief Bipin Rawat on India being prepared for a two-and-a-half front war.
Similar stand offs in the past
- Sumdorong Chu crissis of 1986-87 which took place north of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh which took 10 years to resolve.
- Daulat Beg Oldi stand off of 2013 near the Akasi Chin - Ladakh Line of Actual Control (LoAC)
- Depsang Incursion in 2013 in Ladakh region
- Chumar Stand off in 2014 in east Ladakh
What is the difference between previous stand off's and Doka La stand off ?
- Indian Army is involved in protecting the interest and rights of the 3rd country Bhutan. Since it happened at the tri - junction, in principle all three countries have to agree on the posts.
- The Present stand off represents a considerable change in the status quo, because to build a road represents a permanent presence.
- This time the focus is more on conflict management than on conflict resolution.
- The rhetoric emanated from China is very very heated and persisted for a longer time than usual. China had made the withdrawal of Indian troops a precondition for dialogue. This would be unacceptable to India, unless the PLA also withdraws its troops and road-building teams.
According to Zorawar Daulet Singh, a fellow at center for policy research, New Delhi, what makes the crisis complicated compared to previous episode is the absence of an agreed definition of what is at stake. For China it is about "territorial sovereignty" for India it is about "security implication" emanating from a potential deeper Chinese foothold in the lower Chumbi Vally.
Resolution of the stand off
Despite the crescendo of rhetoric surrounding the crisis India used the "strategy of silence" and stood its ground firmly. There is no question of India bending to Chinese demands, for like in 1967. After almost 3 months of stand off, both side understood the " virtue of restraint " which lead to " De - escalation " of what could have been a serious crisis. The two sides agreed to step back and disengage, thus avoiding a confrontation.
The Indian side has pulled back its personal to the Indian side of the boundary, while China have agreed to halt the road construction. However it is unclear, weather china will patrol the region, which it claims to have been doing earlier. India's patient state craft and deft diplomacy seems to have paid of at least for the moment even though its still a long way to go for the exit ramp.
What prompted China to moderate its stand after weeks of high decibel propaganda?
- BRICS summit in China at this juncture will help consolidate China's informal leadership over the group, through which it is keen to fine tune its " Great Power Diplomacy". Any move by India not to participate in the BRICS summit in China will only hamper China's ambition.
- Trade and Economic factors - China's growth is actually declining, debt levels are dangerously high and labour is getting more expensive. At this moment, it is more than ever dependent on international trade and global production chains to sustain higher levels of GDP growth. Lets not forget the fact that India - China have a trade deficit of $51.2 billion in chines favor.
- China may believe that, making necessary adjustment in Dokalam stand off would help China dilute global perceptions about its aggressive posture towards its neighbors.
But we cant draw any definite conclusion, the jury is still out
Lessons from Doka La for India
- It is very much evident that we live in a " Self help world ". It is important to note that none of the major powers unambiguously and unreservedly supported India's position in Doka La. Even Bhutan did not explicitly request military assistance from India. As Chinese scholar Long Xingchun confidently opines, " Though the U.S and other western countries have the intention to contain China through supporting India, they have a wide range of common interest with China"
- India and China being in a state of " Competitive Coexistence ", China prefers to use its hard power ( economic incentives and military intimidation). China can always outspend us in "Check Book Diplomacy", India has to look to have other kinds of leverage. On the face of it India should convince its neighbors that India is big and brother and not big brother.
- In the era of globalization, Zero Sum has given way for Non Zero Sum Game Theory. India's abstention from Belt and Road Initiative would only frustrate BRI, It will not derail it. So India needs to engage China more at several levels diplomatically, politically, multilaterally and economically.
- As Happymon Jacob who teaches at JNU, New Delhi says "Hyper Nationalism does not pay when it comes to dealing with China. China is not Pakistan. Indian political parties cannot make any domestic gains by whipping up nationalist passion against China. India needs to engage China diplomatically to resolve outstanding conflicts rather than engage in war of words".
The boundary stand-off with China at the Doka La tri-junction is by all accounts unprecedented. These problems are mainly of Beijing’s making, Increasingly driven by hyper nationalism, its foreign policy has excelled in the art of alienating potential friends. Bhutan’s sovereignty must be maintained as that is the basis for the “exemplary” ties between New Delhi and Thimphu. There is little to gain from escalation, and much to lose. The issues have to be addressed through sustained dialogue in a long run.
